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ABSTRACT.  Threats or objections  to  Canadian  claims  to  sovereignty and to  the  exercise of sovereign  rights by Canada in  the  Arctic  in  the 40 years since 
World  War  II  have  come  from  the  United States. In  the  immediate  postwar  era  Canadian  sovereignty  over  minor areas of  the  Arctic  Islands  was  not 
unchallengeable.  Canadian  concerns  focused on the  desire of the  United  States  to  establish  weather  stations  in  the  Arctic  with  or  without  Canadian 
support. By  the early 1950s. and  with  bilateral  agreements  with  the  United  States on the  DEW Line and BMEWS,  Canadian  terrestrial  sovereignty  was 
beyond  question.  Canadian  maritime  claims  continued  to be c ntested  during  the  balance of the  period.  These claims have  taken  the form of  functional 
jurisdiction  over  pollution,  an  historic title to  the  waters of  the  archipelago  and  the  rejection  of  an “international” status for the  waters of  the  Northwest 
Passage.  Canadian  maritime  claims  in  the  Arctic  have not  been  consistently  formulated or consistently  pursued by the  Canadian  government  during  the 
period  due  to  an  evolving  international  law of the  sea  and  American  objections.  The  Canadian  position on fu ctional jurisdiction over  pollution  has  been 
vindicated by the  Law  of the  Sea  Convention, but there  continue  to be significant  doubts  as  to  the  status of  the  archipelagic  waters. 
Key  words:  international law, sovereignty,  historic title, functional jurisdiction, international  straits 
RÉSUMÉ. Au cours des 40 ans qui  ont  suivi  la Deuxitme Guerre  mondiale,  les htats-unis ont btb B les  instigateurs  de  menaces et d’objections  envers le 
Canada  quand  celui-ci  a  decl& ses droits B la  souverainete dans l’Arctique, ou  quand  il  a  voulu  les y exercer.  Juste apds la guerre, la  souverainetb du 
Canada  sur des kgions peu importantes  de  l’archipel  Arctique  btait  loin d’ttre confiiee. Les Canadiens  s’inquibtaient  surtout  de  l’intention des 
Etats-Unis  d’installer des stations  mbt6orologiques  dans  l’Arctique  avec  ou  sans  leur  accord. Au dbbut des annees 50, les accords  bi-latbraux du kseau 
DEW  (Rbseau  d’alerte  avancb) et du  systeme  BMEWS (Systtme d’alerte  avancb pour les  missiles  balistiques)  entre  Canada et  gtats-Unis, venaient 
confirmer  la  souverainete  territoriale du Canada. Les droits B la  souverainetb  maritime continutrent cependant d’ttre remis  en  question  pendant le reste 
de  cette  bpoque. Leur affiiation s’est  manifestbe  sour  la  forme  d’une juridiction administrative  sur  la  pollution, d’un titre  historique  pour les eaux  de 
l’Archipel, et du rejet du statut  d’eaux  “internationales” pour le  passage  du  Nord-Ouest. Les droits B la  souverainete  maritime  du  Canada  dans  l’Arctique 
n’ont  pas  et6  formulds  ou  exerces  avec  cohbrence  par  le  gouvernement  canadien B cause  d   I’bvolution des lois  maritimes  internationales  et desobjections 
americaines  pendant  cette @riode. La position  canadienne  concernant  la  juridiction  administrative  sur  la  pollution  a t6 justifibe  par  la  Convention du 
droit  de  la  mer,  mais  de  grands outes subsistent  quant au statut des eaux de l’archipel. 
Mots clbs: loi internationale,  souverainetb,  titre  historique,  juridiction  administrative,  dbtroits  internationaux 
Traduit  pour le journal par  Nbsida  Loyer. 
INTRODUCTION 
This  paper  might have been  subtitled “The enemy within,” for 
during the last 40 years the greatest practical  threat to Canadian 
aspirations in the  Arctic has been  posed,  curiously enough, by 
its formidable ally to the south, the  United  States  of  America. 
The  issues  have  changed  during  these  years  but U.S. defence 
policy has continued to depend upon relatively free access to the 
Canadian Arctic, both  lands  and  waters.  Implicit  in  this  policy 
has  been  the  threat  that  while  Canadian  cooperation  is  expected 
and appreciated, it might not always be strictly or legally 
necessary. Thus in 1947 there was  the  possibility  that  the  United 
States  might establish weather stations in unexplored  parts of 
the  High Arctic, while in 1985 the  United  States  maintained  that 
the U.S. CGS Polar Sea had  the  right to navigate  the  Northwest 
Passage  without he consent of Canada. The United States takes 
a similar view of the transit rights of its nuclear-powered 
submarines. But, make no mistake, the  issues  have changed, 
and the concerns of Canada in the Arctic, as illustrated by the 
voyages of the SS Manhattan and the U . S. CGS Polar  Sea, have 
become maritime concerns rather than terrestrial concerns. 
Nobody  would suggest in 1987 that  Canada’s  sovereignty over 
the  arctic  mainland  and archipelago was in any way open to 
question, but  the  precise  nature of Canada’s sovereign  rights 
over the archipelagic waters is still a  matter of heated  debate  and 
the cause of significant differences of  opinion  between  these 
two  North  American  powers. 
By contrast, Canada’s relations with its other arctic neighbour, 
Denmark, concerning Greenland, have been marked  by  a  high 
degree  of international cooperation  and  agreements on a  conti- 
nental  shelf boundary, environmental  protection  and fisheries. 
There have, with one minor exception, been no overt  disagree- 
ments  with  Denmark  during  this  period over Canada’s  arctic 
claims (Smith, 1952; Canadian Practice, 1981). Relations  have 
not always been rosy, however, for the Greenlanders were 
firmly opposed to the Arctic Pilot Project in the 1980s and 
Denmark has never  supported  a sector theory of sovereignty. 
One can also observe a fair degree  of  congruency  between 
Canadian  and Soviet arctic  marine  policies (Butler, 1971, 
1978). Both  Canada  and  the Soviet Union  have  claimed  special 
status for their  northern  straits:  the  Northeast  Passage  and  the 
Northwest Passage. Implicitly  the Soviet Union is also a  sup- 
porter  of sector claims in the Arctic.  As  a result the Soviet Union 
has  tended  to  be supportive of Canadian claims for special status 
for arctic waters. There may have been missions by Soviet 
submarines into Canadian arctic waters, but  Canada’s  sover- 
eignty  assertions  have  never been openly or consistently  chal- 
lenged by the Soviet Union. 
This paper is intended as a survey of Canadian sovereignty 
assertion in the Arctic over the last 40 years. The term  sover- 
eignty  assertion has been given  a  broad  interpretation here. It is 
recognized  that  the  term sovereignty generally connotes exclu- 
sive powers over a defined portion of the globe (Island of 
Palmas Case, 1928; Brownlie, 1979; Triggs, 1986; Shaw, 
1986). Sovereignty, as viewed in this sense, will  extend to the 
terrestrial  portions  of  a state, its internal waters and, subject to 
the  right  of innocent passage, its territorial seas. Used  in  this 
strict sense the paper would be confined to Canada’s claims to 
sovereignty over terrestrial areas and its claim that the waters of 
the Arctic Archipelago should be treated as historic internal 
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waters.  We  could also deal in this context with  the status of the 
Northwest Passage and the argument that, even if the passage is 
not constituted by internal waters, it is at the very least at certain 
points entirely within the territorial sea of Canada. 
However, rather than limit the scope of the paper in this 
manner, the  term sovereignty assertion has also been  used  to 
embrace the more limited claims to functional jurisdiction 
(some of which are referred to as  sovereign rights in the Third 
Law  of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS 111, 1982) over subma- 
rine  and arctic marine areas that have been  made by Canada 
during  this period. The classic example of this  type of claim is 
the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (Government of 
Canada, 1970a). It is not suggested here that these elements of 
functional jurisdiction constitute territorial sovereignty, and it is 
recognized  that the validity of claims of this  nature depends, 
among other things, upon the recognized sovereignty of the 
littoral state. But nevertheless, these claims to jurisdiction are 
claims made at the expense of the alternative jurisdiction of 
international authorities such as the International Maritime 
Organization and  of flag states. As such they  merit  treatment  in 
this paper. 
The test of “sovereignty” adopted in this paper is that of 
“effective occupation” as qualified in two particulars. First, the 
test  has to be interpreted taking into account the nature of the 
territory  involved  and  its degree of habitability (Eastern Green- 
land Case, 1933). Second, at least with respect to land, any 
application of the test should  bear in mind the relativity of the 
concepts of sovereignty and title in international law. Gener- 
ally, all that a state has to do  is to prove a better title than that 
claimed by another state. 
Although the context for applying the test of effective occu- 
pation will vary, international tribunals have generally looked to 
such things as: settlement, enactment and implementation of 
legislation, exercise of criminal jurisdiction over foreign nation- 
als, grants of concessions to and  taxing of foreign nationals, 
surveys and  mapping activities that evidence a claim and the 
establishment of licensing systems for activities such as fishing, 
whaling  and sealing (Triggs, 1986). 
It  should  be apparent from an application of these criteria that 
with the exception of the immediate postwar period  (discussed 
below), Canada’s sovereignty over its terrestriul areas has  been 
unimpeachable throughout the period. There is, in addition, a 
continuing dispute with  Denmark over the sovereignty to Hans 
Island  in  Nares Strait between Greenland and Ellesmere Island. 
Different considerations, however, apply  to sovereignty claims 
(in the strict sense) over marine areas. With respect to marine 
areas, an international adjudicator is likely to insist upon a test 
of absolute title, rather than a relatively better title. The adjudi- 
cator will, in effect, be deciding whether waters should be 
subject to the territorial sovereignty of the coastal state, or 
whether they should be subject to the typical international 
marine regime, which balances the rights of a coastal state 
against those of the world community. A coastal state therefore 
faces a much stiffer test if it wishes to establish exclusive 
sovereignty over marine areas (Blum, 1965). In effect, a coastal 
state has to establish international acquiescence in order to 
validate  an historic title claim. Nevertheless, the unusual geo- 
graphical, historical and climatic features of the Arctic Archi- 
pelago do not preclude this type of claim (Blum, 1965; Johnston, 
1934). 
Finally, it should be emphasized that  in considering Canada’s 
“sovereignty assertion” and objections thereto, we have lim- 
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ited ourselves to  what  might  be d scribed as “legal” objections. 
This paper does not accept, for example, the rather loose 
allegation that  Canada’s arctic sovereignty is less real  because 
of a supposed inability to defend itself from a Soviet attack. 
BACKGROUND 
In order to maintain some general perspective we shall review 
the legal and historical context for Canadian claims during the 
40-year period  under review. 
In 1947, Canada, like other arctic states, was just emerging 
from  World  War 11, a war  that  had seen a very  high  level  of 
cooperation between the United States and Canada. Large  num- 
bers of U . S . citizens had  been  posted to the Canadian Arctic and 
cooperation between the allies took three main forms. These 
were the Norman  Wells Oil Development and Canol Pipeline, 
the Northwest Staging Route and Alaska Highway  to protect 
Alaska  and Project Crimson in the Eastern Arctic. The latter 
involved the construction of airfields at such  places  as  Coral 
Harbour and Frobisher Bay (Diubaldo, 1981). All three ven- 
tures involved heavy U.S. investments of capital and labour in 
the Canadian Arctic and led to Canadian sovereignty concerns 
during the war. 
The next two decades saw a polarization of world affairs 
between  NATO countries and the Soviet bloc. The Arctic grew 
in importance, along  with increasing awareness of its  strategic 
location. This led directly to the construction and  operation of 
U.S.-Canadian weather stations in the late 1940s, followed by 
the DEW Line in the late 1950s to protect against a Soviet 
bomber attack. East-West conflicts continued to come to the 
fore in the Arctic in the second half  of the period in two contexts: 
first, the capabilities of Soviet nuclear submarines to pass 
undetected through Canadian arctic waters, thereby avoiding 
the GIUK (Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom) gap, and 
second, the ability of allied forces to detect hostile plane and 
missile attacks across the Arctic Ocean. The DEW Line declined 
in importance with the perception that the major threat to North 
American security would come from intercontinental missiles 
rather than bombers. 
The post-World War I1 era has also seen a marked expansion 
in the maritime claims of all coastal states. This has led to 
conflict between major maritime powers, such as the United 
States, and coastal powers, such as Canada. The maritime 
powers have tried to restrict the attempts of coastal states to 
extend their jurisdiction in ways that might interfere with  the 
freedom of navigation. It is this policy goal that, in large part, 
has  fueled U.S. opposition to various Canadian maritime claims 
in the Arctic. In general, the extended functional claims of the 
coastal states have  been  vindicated  by developments in interna- 
tional law  and the Third United  Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS 111, 1982). Hence the claims of 
coastal states to a 12-mile territorial sea, a continental shelf  and 
a 200-mile exclusive economic zone have all been accepted. 
Nevertheless, Canadian claims in the North have still occa- 
sioned vociferous U.S. objections, particularly to sector claims, 
the internal status of the Northwest Passage, the Arctic Waters 
Pollution Prevention Act and the status of the archipelagic 
waters as historic internal waters. 
The remainder of the paper is organized in two parts. The first 
is a review of sovereign claims over terrestrial areas in the 
Canadian Arctic and deals with problems raised by U.S.- 
Canadian weather stations and the DEW Line. The second  and 
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more  important  part of the  paper  looks  at  Canada’s  maritime 
claims  and  addresses  those  matters  listed  above  that  have  proven 
so contentious  to  the  United States. 
SOVEREIGNTY  OVER  THE  ARCTIC  MAINLAND AND ARCHIPELAGO 
Canadian  sovereignty  in all territories  in  the  Canadian  sector  is 
unchallenged but not  unchallengeable. “ H . H .  Wrong,  Associ- 
ate  Under-Secretary of State,  External  Affairs, 24 June 1946. 
[Government of Canada, 1977:  1570.1 
Background 
Canada  obtained  a  transfer of the  Hudson  Bay  territories  in 
1870, and  in  1880  the  Arctic  Islands  Order  in  Council  received 
the  consent of Her Majesty.  The imprecisely  worded  Order  in 
Council  transferred  to  Canada “all British  territories  and  pos- 
sessions in North America, not already included within the 
Dominion of Canada and all Islands adjacent to any such 
Territories or Possessions . . .” (Government of Canada, 
1948: 169). There was  nothing  in  this  transfer to support  Cana- 
da’s claims to sovereignty vis-&vis the United States or the 
European powers, and it was  left to Captain  Bernier’s  voyages 
in the CGS Arctic and those of other government-sponsored 
expeditions to consolidate Canada’s title (Smith, 1980). By 
1947 it could  be  assumed  that  Canada’s  title  had  been  perfected 
to  most  of  the  arctic islands. However  there  were  some  minor 
surprises  and  some  important  government  concerns in the 
immediate  postwar era. As to surprises, in  1948  and 1949 new 
territories  were  discovered  in  Foxe  Basin:  Prince  Charles Isl nd,
Air  Force  Island  and  Foley  Island  (Polar Record, 1951; Arctic, 
1948, 1949). The concerns  were  more serious. 
Arctic  Weather Stations 
In 1946 the United States, reviving a stillborn proposal of 
1942  (Smith,  1980),  proposed  the  construction of several  weather 
stations in the Arctic Archipelago, which would be either 
established  and  operated by the  United  States or alternatively  on 
a cooperative basis with Canada (Government of Canada, 
1977). At about the same time the Department of External 
Affairs obtained a copy of a report prepared by a U.S. Air 
Coordinating Committee. The  report  suggested that, notwith- 
standing  Canada’s sector claims (discussed below), U . S . Army 
reconnaissance flights be  conducted  in the sector  west of Green- 
land to discover if “islands exist which  might  be  claimed by  the 
United States” with  a  view to the  establishment of a  weather 
station  (Government of Canada, 1977: 1546). Not surprisingly, 
this  threat of unilateral  action  led to major  concerns  within  the 
Canadian government. 
The United States was  anxious to press  ahead  with  its 
proposed development of the stations, while the Canadian 
government had mixed feelings. On the one hand, Canada 
appreciated  the  United States’ concerns and  foresaw “the 
overall  requirements of continental security and defence” (Gov- 
ernment of Canada, 1977: 1558). If  the  request  were  not  acceded 
to, there  was  the  risk  of  unilateral  action  by  the  United States as 
foreshadowed in the leaked memorandum. But on the other 
hand, there were several drawbacks to proceeding. First, the 
request could only be granted on terms that would protect 
Canadian sovereignty and yet would not expose Canada to 
similar  requests from other nations. Second, in  the  interests of 
regional defence, Canada  might  be  forced to commit  money  and 
scarce  manpower  considerably  beyond  what  might  be  necessary 
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“from the standpoint of Canadian  defence alone” (Government 
of Canada,  1977:1559). 
Canada succeeded in postponing the U.S. requests during 
1946, the  question  being  eventually  considered  in  December of 
that year as part of the overall issue of postwar cooperation 
between  the  two powers.  The result  was  an  agreement  announced 
on  4  March  1947  by C.D. Howe  in  the  House  of  Commons  to 
establish joint weather stations at Resolute, Eureka Sound, 
Mould Bay, Isachsen and Alert (Wiktor, 1982). Cooperation 
was  to  be  on  Canadian terms and Howe, then  the  Minister of 
Reconstruction  and Supply, was  able to state, somewhat  disin- 
genuously, that: 
The  United  States  has  therefore  undertaken  to  assist  Canada  in 
the  establishment  and  operation of these  northern  stations  which 
will, of course,  be  under  the  control of the  Canadian  government 
which  will supply the  officers  in  charge.  [Hansard, 
1947(2):990.] 
Thus  ended  what  was  the  last  potential  legal  threat o Cana- 
dian  sovereignty over its arctic lands. In practice, U.S. support, 
especially shipping, was essential for the establishment and 
resupply of the  weather stations, and it was  not  until  1954  that 
Canada  assumed  sole  responsibility for supplying these stations 
(Polar Record,  1956) and  not  until  1972  that  the  United  States 
completely  withdrew  its  personnel  (Polar Record, 1972). 
The DEW  Line  Stations 
If there were any residual doubts about U.S. territorial 
ambitions  in  the  Canadian  Arctic after this time, they  were  put  to 
rest by the  terms of the  agreements to establish  the  DEW  Line 
stations in the Canadian Arctic. The DEW Line, the farthest 
north  of  three radar lines, was  designed  to  protect  the  United 
States from a Soviet bomber attack over the Pole. It was 
primarily of benefit to the  United States, but  the  arrangement 
was  entered into in  the  name  and  spirit  of  continental defence. 
The exchange of notes evidencing the  agreement  provided 
that  the  location  of  the  DEW  Line  sites  was  to  be  subject  to  the 
agreement of Canadian authorities (Government of Canada, 
1955). Nothing in the agreement was to “derogate from the 
application of Canadian Law,” including  customs  and  immi- 
gration procedures, although  relief  might  be  granted  in  appro- 
priate circumstances.  The costs of construction  and  operation 
were to be the responsibility of the United States, although 
Canada  was to be entitled to assume the operation  and  manning 
of the installations in  the future if it wished.  Port  and  airstrip 
facilities constructed for the DEW Line stations were to be 
available for Canadian  use. 
The DEW Line agreement was followed by a subsequent 
agreement in 1959 on the Ballistic Missile Early Warning 
System (BMEWS) (Government of Canada, 1959). This agree- 
ment  was  modelled on the  DEW  Line agreement.  The impor- 
tance of these agreements  should  not  be  overestimated  in  the 
context of sovereignty, since Canada’s terrestrial claims  were 
probably  beyond  question by this time. The agreements  merely 
served to reinforce that conclusion. They did not contain an 
explicit recognition of Canadian sovereignty throughout the 
Arctic, but the continuing  cooperation  shown by these and  other 
arrangements “constituted at least defucto recognition, of a  sort 
which  could  not  be  reasonably  interpreted as other  than  com- 
plete and permanent” (Smith, 1980:18). The same comment 
can  be  made  about  the  1985 Canada-U. S . Agreement  providing 
for  the  new cost-shared North  Warning System. Although  the 
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agreement was heralded by Hon. Eric Nielsen, Minister of 
National Defence, as strengthening and assuring Canadian 
sovereignty (Hansard, 1985), in truth that territorial sovereignty 
was not threatened at all, except perhaps by the continued 
spectre of a Soviet attack. It is only Canada’s maritime claims, 
and  then only their form, that can in  any sense be  said to be 
threatened by U.S. policies at present. 
CANADIAN MARITIME CLAIMS 
Canadian maritime claims in the Arctic during this period 
have  taken three forms. First, there are the claims to functional 
jurisdiction typified by the Arctic Waters Pollution  Prevention 
Act. Second, there are claims that Canada has full sovereignty 
over the archipelagic waters, based on any  one of a number of 
different theories. Third, there are the claims that the Northwest 
Passage is not an international strait. Each class of claim 
represents  a type of “sovereignty assertion” and  will  be dealt 
with separately. 
Functional  Jurisdiction Claims 
On 8 April 1970, following the voyages of the S S  Manhattan 
through the Northwest Passage, the Canadian government intro- 
duced the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act in the House 
of Commons. The bill purported to establish a 100-nautical-mile 
pollution prevention zone in arctic waters within  which  Canada 
would control shipping, prescribe standards of vessel construc- 
tion, navigation and operation and, if necessary, prohibit pas- 
sage. At the same time Canada proposed to extend its territorial 
sea from 3 to 12 nautical miles, a move that could have a 
significant effect on transit through the Northwest Passage. 
There could be no doubt about the United States’ trenchant 
reaction to these claims: “International law provides no basis 
for these proposed unilateral extensions of jurisdiction on the 
high seas, and the United States can neither accept nor acqui- 
esce in the assertion of such jurisdiction” (United States Depart- 
ment  of State, 1970:605). The Canadian initiative, argued the 
United States, was  an unacceptable interference with the juris- 
diction of the flag state. If these waters were all “high seas,” the 
exercise of jurisdiction was  indeed unusual, but, as we shall see, 
part of the Canadian claim was that a  portion of these waters 
were  not  high seas. In any event, it was certainly not  a claim to 
absolute territorial sovereignty throughout the 100-mile  zone. 
Canada attempted to justify the legislation on several grounds 
but at the same time abrogated its acceptance of the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. It thereby 
precluded the possibility that the United States might unilater- 
ally refer the dispute to that court. Canada’s main  argument  in 
support of the legislation was based on the failure of multilateral 
initiatives  through  the  International  Maritime  Consultative  Organ- 
ization to achieve an acceptable degree of pollution control. 
This, it was said, made it necessary for coastal states to act in 
“self-defence” to protect their coastlines (Government of  Can- 
ada, 1970b). Canada also claimed that it was fulfilling environ- 
mental protection responsibilities, which it owed to the 
international community, and that it was ridiculous to talk about 
“freedom of the high seas” when the area was frozen for much 
of the year and the inhabitants (the Inuit) used the ice much as 
they  would land (Pharand, 1984; VanderZwaag and Pharand, 
1983). 
The issue having been joined, the Canadian government set 
about vindicating its position in the multilateral context of the 
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Third  United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. To 
further its contentions, Canada tabled a provision for what 
became  Part XI1  of the Convention: Protection and  Preservation 
of the  Marine Environment (McRae and Goundrey, 1982). As 
adopted at Montego Bay in 1982, Article 234, “ice-covered 
areas,” reads as follows: 
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non- 
discriminatory  laws  and  regulations  for the prevention, reduc- 
tion and control  of  marine  pollution  from  vessels in ice-covered 
areas within the  limits of the exclusive  economic  zone,  where 
particularly  severe  climatic  conditions  and  the  presence  of  ice 
covering such areas  for  most  of  the  year  create  obstructions  or 
exceptional  hazards  to  navigation, and pollution of the  marine 
environment  could  cause  major harm to or irreversible distur- 
bance  of  the  ecological  balance.  Such laws and  regulations shall 
have  due  regard  to  navigation and the  protection  and  preserva- 
tion of the marine environment based on the best available 
scientific  evidence. [UNCLOS 111, 1982.1 
This article, introduced and championed by the Canadian 
delegation  and acquiesced to by the U.S. government, has  been 
analyzed elsewhere (McRae and Goundrey, 1982). It has in 
large part, if not completely, legitimized the Canadian legisla- 
tion. In one particular the article has clearly strengthened 
Canada’s hand, for it permits the application of marine pollution 
legislation throughout the 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic 
zone rather than the 100-mile arctic zone claimed by Canada. 
However, the convention, although signed in 1982, has  yet  to 
enter into force. The article is therefore not  binding as a matter 
of conventional law  and can only be looked to as  a crystalliza- 
tion or codification of customary international law. 
To complete this review of functional initiatives, mention 
should  be  made  of Canada’s claim to an extended fisheries zone. 
In  1977 Canada claimed a 200-mile exclusive fisheries zone. 
Whatever objections might have been made  at the time must 
now  be taken to be without merit, for the concept  of  a  200-mile 
exclusive economic zone embracing fishing rights is now part of 
international law. 
The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act  (AWPPA)  was  a 
bold initiative - a claim to an extensive functional jurisdiction 
that set the law journals and international lawyers “a-twitter” 
for several years. But  how did it relate to more extensive claims 
of sovereignty over the archipelagic waters? The problem  can 
perhaps best  be considered in light of Article 234. That article 
accords a coastal state certain rights in the exclusive economic 
zone, which is an area beyond the territorial sea and internal 
waters of a coastal state. Within its internal waters, a coastal 
state has no need of Article 234, for these are subject to the 
exciusive sovereignty of the coastal state. What  then is the status 
of the archipelagic waters? 
Canada was pursuing an arctic maritime policy using two 
quite separate approaches. The policy was one of maximization 
of control over shipping activities in archipelagic waters. This 
could be attained by a claim of functional jurisdiction over 
pollution control, but this approach did have disadvantages. For 
example, a coastal state relying upon Article 234 might not  have 
the power to suspend navigation or  to charge for icebreaker 
escorts. Furthermore, the coastal state could only rely upon 
Article 234 for those areas covered by ice “for most of the 
year. ’ ’ 
The alternative and more radical approach is to endeavour to 
establish that the archipelagic waters are internal waters subject 
to the exclusive sovereignty of the coastal state and therefore not 
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subject to a  right  of  innocent passage. This  approach, although 
perhaps  not  made fully explicit by Canadian  authorities  until  the 
1970s, can be traced  back to the  early  part of the  century  and  has 
made fitful appearances from  time to time in the intervening 
decades. 
Canadian Internal Waters 
It  has  always  been difficult to identify  the  precise  quality of 
Canadian  maritime claims in  the Arctic. The difficulty begins 
with  the  notorious  sector claim suggested by Senator Poirier  in 
1907  in  the Senate. He  stated infer  alia: 
A country whose possessions to-day goes up to the Arctic 
regions,  will  have  a  right . , . to  all  the  lands  that  are  found in 
the  waters  between  a  line  extending  from its eastern  extremity 
north and another line extending from the western extremity 
north. . . . From 141 to 60 degrees west we are on Canadian 
territory. [Hansard, 1907:271.] 
Hence  was born, unofficially, the  Canadian  sector claim, and 
although it seems to have  formed the basis of  Captain  Bernier’s 
arctic claims for Canada, it has since had  a  rocky history. It has 
never been accepted by the United States or international 
lawyers as a  basis for acquiring territory (Smith, 1966). Never- 
theless, official maps, published with the imprimatur of the 
Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, Canada, still 
show  an international boundary claim along  the  141st  and  60th 
degrees  of longitude. 
In its inception the claim was a claim to lands within the 
sector  and  was  not  a claim to waters or ice, but  this  has  not 
always  been the case. Canadian  equivocation on the  subject  is 
well illustrated by comments made in 1956 and 1957 in the 
House  of  Commons  by  two successive ministers of Northern 
Affairs  and  National  Resources:  Jean  Lesage  and  Alvin  Hamil- 
ton. In August 1956 a member inquired of Lesage, then the 
minister, whether  there  had ever been any  discussion  “of the 
principle of ownership of the  ice cap north  of the land. ” Lesage 
responded,  “we have  never  subscribed to the  sector  theory  in 
application to ice . . . the sea, be it frozen or in its natural  liquid 
state, is  the sea, and our sovereignty exists over the  lands  and 
over our temtorial waters”  (Hansard, 1956[7]:6955). A year 
later the  tables  were reversed, with  Lesage  asking of Hamilton, 
now the minister, whether the waters  north of the  archipelago 
were “Canadian waters.” Hamilton equivocated: the islands 
were  part  of Canada, but as  to the  northern  waters  covered  with 
moving ice “the ordinary rules of international law  may or may 
not  have application” (Hansard, 1957[2]:1559). 
By the following year it appears that greater clarity had 
emerged. The evidence for this is a 1969 speech by Prime 
Minister  Trudeau on arctic sovereignty. Trudeau  quoted  from  a 
1958 speech of Alvin  Hamilton’s to the effect that: “The area to 
the north of Canada, including the islands and the waters 
between  the  islands  and areas beyond are looked  upon as our 
own. . . . This is national domain”  (Hansard, 1969[8]:8720). 
Trudeau  continued his 1969 speech by stating that  this  view  of 
the waters as being internal waters was not something with 
which other states might agree. But if this too amounted to 
equivocation, there could be no misunderstanding about the 
statement  made  as part of the official Canadian response to U. S . 
objections to the AWPPA: “with respect to the waters of the 
Arctic Archipelago, the position  of  Canada  has always been that 
these  waters are regarded as Canadian” (Government  of  Can- 
ada, 1970b:  18). A statement to the same effect was  made  in the 
House on the same day  (16 April  1970) by  the  Hon. Mitchell 
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Sharp, then  Secretary of State for External Affairs (Hansard, 
1970). Was there not  then  an  inconsistency  here? On the one 
hand  the  government  was at pains to point  out  that  the  AWPPA 
represented  a claim  to specialized jurisdiction and  not  sover- 
eignty. On the other  hand, the  government  was  stating  that  these 
waters  were  Canadian (i.e., internal) waters.  Did  not  the  first 
position  prejudice  the latter? Mitchell Sharp was  ready for this 
attack  and  responded  that the North  Atlantic  Fisheries  Arbitra- 
tion  case “held that  a state may, without  prejudice to its claim to 
evereignty over the whole of a particular area of the sea, 
exercise only so much part of its sovereign  powers over such 
part of the area as may  be  necessary for immediate  purposes” 
(Hansard, 1970). 
Here, then, we  have  a clear statement as to the dual nature of 
Canada’s legislative activities. What is unclear is why claims to 
territorial  sovereignty  and  associated  arguments  were  not  pressed 
more  forcefully  in  1970. It was  not  until  nearly  15  years later, 
following  the  transit  of the U.S. CGS Polar Sea through  the 
Northwest Passage, that the Canadian government moved to 
strengthen its “Canadian waters” argument. Perhaps by this 
time Canada felt surer of its position, for it accepted, once 
again, the  compulsory jurisdiction of the International  Court of 
Justice. However, it is difficult to see what has changed  since 
1970 to improve  significantly Canada’s internal  waters claim. 
The  passage of this  U.S. icebreaker, unaccompanied by  any 
Canadian vessel, through the Northwest Passage in the summer 
of 1985  raised  public concerns and questions in the House of 
Commons  about  sovereignty  in  the  archipelagic  waters. It led  to 
a formal statement in the House of Commons by the Right 
Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, 
and  the  drawing  of “straight baselines” to surround the archi- 
pelago. In the first place, Clark stated, the assurance of the 
United States had been obtained to the effect that “the voyage of 
the Polar  Sea was  without  prejudice to Canada’s legal posi- 
tion.” But  he  went on to assert, in ringing phrases, that: 
Canada’s  sovereignty  in  the  Arctic  is  indivisible.  It  embraces 
land,  sea and ice.  It  extends  without  interruption  to  the  seaward 
facing  coasts  of  the  Arctic  islands.  These  islands are joined and 
not divided, by the  waters  between  them. . . . The  policy of the 
government is to maintain the natural unity of the Canadian 
Arctic  archipelago  and to preserve  Canada’s  sovereignty  over 
land,  sea and ice  undiminished  and  undivided.  [Hansard, 
1985(5):6463.] 
In order  to establish this “unity,”  or at least to clarify it for 
the  international community, the minister informed  the  House 
that “straight baselines” under the Territorial Sea and  Fishing 
Zones Act (Government of Canada, 1970~) would be drawn 
around  the archipelago, thus making  the case that  all the waters 
landward  of the baselines  would  be “Canada’s historical  inter- 
nal waters” (Hansard, 19855463; Government of Canada, 
1985a). 
This  was  an  extremely  important step for the government to 
take. It had  been  heralded  in 1970, but this latest  statement  was 
clear and unequivocal. Historic  waters  in  international  law  are 
waters  that  by  long  usage  and  general  acquiescence, express or 
implied, are entitled to the status of “internal waters”  -that is, 
waters that are subject to the full sovereignty of the coastal 
state and, most importantly, through  which  there xists no right 
of innocent  passage.  Transportation  through the arctic waters 
would then become a matter for negotiation and agreement, 
rather than right. 
To fend  off possible objections from the United States, the 
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Canadian government reiterated, as it had at the time of the 
AWPPA, that it would be willing to enter into a suitable 
cooperative  arrangement  with  the  United States. Such  an  arrange- 
ment  ought to have  advantages for both states. For  Canada, it 
would  mean  recognition  and  legitimization  of its claim, but to 
the  United States it would  mean  guaranteed access, while  at  the 
same  time  precluding  access by other states (such as the Soviet 
Union)  that  did  not  have  a  comparable  agreement. 
As  an  additional  part  of  the  package to strengthen  Canadian 
claims as to the internal status of these waters, Clark also 
announced the introduction of the Canadian Laws Offshore 
Application Act (Government of Canada, 1985b). Although 
much of this legislation deals with technical matters of law 
reform, it also  supported  Canadian  arguments  by  establishing 
that  the  archipelagic  waters  were  within  the  Northwest  Territo- 
ries. The legislation was given first reading but was never 
debated  and  has  since  died on the order paper. The failure of the 
government to press  this  legislation  leaves  unresolved  questions 
about the strength of Canada’s claims, for the bill was the 
obvious  adjunct o the  September  straight  baselines order. Some 
have speculated, however, that the bill  might  represent  a dan- 
gerous  concession  of fshore areas to the territorial government 
by the federal government, dangerous  because it might  inflate 
the aspirations of coastal provinces. This would prove to be 
unnecessary  in  the event that Canada were able to negotiate  a 
form of transit agreement with the United States as recom- 
mended by the Report of the Special Joint Committee on 
Canada’s  International  Relations  (Government of Canada,  1986). 
Once  the  cooperation  of the United States can  be assured, there 
is  really  no  threat to the Canadian  view  that these waters  are 
internal, and therefore no  need  for the federal  government to 
make significant domestic concessions to the Territories or  the 
coastal  provinces. 
In conclusion, at the present  time  it  is  not clear that  Canada 
could  establish to the satisfaction of  an  international  tribunal 
that  the  archipelagic  waters  are  historic  internal waters, espe- 
cially  given  the  need to establish  what we described  above as an 
absolute title rather  than just a  relatively  better title than  any 
other state. The  Canadian  government  can  hardly  claim to have 
consistently  pressed  its claim  over the last 40 years. On  the other 
hand,  the U.S.  government, the state most  seriously  affected  by 
Canadian  claims to special status, has  not  acquiesced  and  indeed 
has  objected consistently. 
The  Northwest  Passage 
The Northwest  Passage  (in  reality  a  combination of passages) 
is  the  key to regular  shipping  in the Arctic. It has been  variously 
suggested as a  way  of  shipping  Alaskan  resources to markets 
(although  not  oil since the  construction of the  Alaska  pipeline) 
and as a  means  of  reducing  shipping  distances  between  Europe 
and Japan. Although  there  are several potential  routes  through 
the Passage, the  Prince  of  Wales Strait, between  Banks  Island 
and  Victoria Island, is the most  favoured  for deep draft vessels. 
At its narrowest  this  passage  is  only 6.5 miles  wide - well 
closed by the 12-mile  territorial  sea  claimed by Canada. There  is 
also  another choke point in the  main  shipping route in  Barrow 
Strait  between  Lowther  and  Young islands, where  the  passage 
shrinks to 15.5 miles (Pharand, 1984). 
Canada  and  the  United States have, for years, disagreed as to 
the  international status of the  Northwest Passage.  The United 
States  is of the  view  that  the  waters form an  international strait 
through which there is a non-suspendable right of “transit 
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passage” (UNCLOS 111, 1982;  Pharand, 1984), which would 
permit, inter alia, submerged  submarine transits. Canada  takes 
the  view  that  the  Passage  has  exactly  the  same status as its  other 
archipelagic waters (i.e., internal waters) and has therefore 
enclosed  the  Passage  within  the  straight  baselines  referred to 
above.  This position, most  clearly  enunciated  in  the  Canadian 
response to U.S. objections to the  AWPPA package, is  based  on 
the  view  that  the  waters  have  never  been  used  for  international 
navigation and therefore cannot amount to an international 
strait: 
The  Canadian  Government is  aware  of  United  States  interest  in 
ensuring freedom of transit through international straits, but 
rejects any suggestion that the Northwest Passage is such an 
international  strait.  The  widespread  interest  in  opening  up  the 
Northwest  Passage  to  commercial  shipping  and  the  well-known 
commitment  of  the  Canadian  Government  to  this  end are them- 
selves  ample  proof  that  it  has  not  heretofore  been  possible  to 
utilize the Northwest Passage as a route for shipping. The 
Northwest  Passage  has  not  attained the status of an  international 
strait  by  customary  usage  nor  has it  been  defined  as  such  by 
conventional  international  law.  The  Canadian  Government  reit- 
erates  its  determination  to  open  up  the  Northwest  Passage  to  safe 
navigation  for  the  shipping of all  nations  subject,  however,  to 
necessary  conditions  required  to  protect  the  delicate  ecological 
balance  of  the  Canadian  Arctic.  [Government of Canada, 
197Ob3612.1 
At present  this difference of opinion  continues despite the 
vigour with which Canadian arguments have been pressed. 
Undoubtedly,  passages  such as that of the U.S. CGS Polar Sea 
do little to improve  the  Canadian position, but they may not 
have damaged it if, as has been announced, appropriate dis- 
claimers  were  obtained  from  the  United States. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Sovereignty  becomes an issue once threatened, but  in  between 
times  interest lapses, for sovereignty  tends to be  assumed  from 
the  colour of the  map or the  colour  of  the  adjacent  terrestrial 
areas  rather  than  asserted on a  daily  basis.  Canadian  sovereignty 
assertion throughout this period has given the appearance of 
being reactive. The key Canadian statements and actions on 
arctic  territorial  sovereignty  and  on  more  functional claims to 
jurisdiction have  all  followed  directly from a threat, perceived 
or real, and  those threats, despite the Cold War, the  Korean  War 
and  the  division  between NATO and  Warsaw  Pact countries, 
have  all  come from the United States: weather stations, the S S  
Manhattan and  the U.S. CGS Polar  Sea. But  it  would  be  going 
too far to suggest  that  these  threats  were  the cause of, as  well  as 
the  occasion for, Canadian activity. There is  evidence of a  more 
planned approach to arctic sovereignty, which is particularly 
apparent  in  the  second  half of the period. The years  prior  to  the 
introduction of the AWPPA saw Canadian participation in 
multilateral  forums dealing with  pollution control. In 1970  the 
AWPPA  was  introduced as part  of  an overall plan  dealing  with 
the extension of coastal jurisdiction. At the same time the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the international court  was denied. 
The Canadian government then worked hard to bring about 
changes  in the law, not forgetting that  an alternative route to 
greater control over the archipelagic waters was an internal 
waters  designation for the area. The transit of the U.S. CGS 
Polar  Sea in  1985  saw  the  policy  come  together once again  with 
the  promulgation of the straight baselines, the  broad  acceptance 
of Article  234 of  UNCLOS I11  by the  international  community 
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and  the  reacceptance  by  Canada of the  compulsory jurisdiction 
of the  international court. But there is  a gap in  this  pattern. 
The  changes  that  have  been  brought  in  international  law  since 
1970 have  related to functional jurisdiction. There has  been  no 
indication during that time that the rules pertaining to the 
establishment of an  historic title have  been relaxed. Indeed, it 
would  be  surprising if they had, since  many of the  goals of the 
coastal  states  can  now  be  met  through the exercise of  recognized 
functional jurisdiction, whether over fisheries, the  continental 
shelf or pollution control. At  the  same  time  it  is  hard to point  to 
any particular activities of the federal government that have 
strengthened  the  historic  waters claims since 1970. The straight 
baselines order can  hardly  be  relied upon, for  that  merely  made 
the nature of the claim manifest. It is true that the federal 
government has settled an Inuit title claim recognizing the 
special status of waters  in  the  Western Arctic, but at around  the 
same  time it allowed  its  proposed offshore laws legislation to 
lapse  (Government of Canada, 1984). That legislation would 
clearly  and  unequivocally  have established the “internal” sta- 
tus  of  the  archipelagic  waters  in domestic law, and  the  failure  of 
the federal government to pursue the goal is something of a 
puzzle. 
There have,  however, been successes in  the  Canadian  policy 
of sovereignty assertion. There were doubts as to Canadian 
arctic  sovereignty  in 1947, and  doubts still remain  in 1987, but 
the  nature of the  doubts has  changed. In 1947 the  doubts  related 
to  Canada’s  ability to resist a U.S.  claim to an  undiscovered or 
unexplored portion of the archipelago. These doubts soon 
evaporated, as have  doubts as to the  validity of the AWPPA. But 
in 1987 we continue to have  doubts as to the  precise status of the 
archipelagic  waters:  are  they  historic  internal waters, are they 
riven by an international strait, or are they composed of the 
usual conjunction of internal waters, territorial sea and eco- 
nomic  zones subject, however,  to enhanced functional jurisdic- 
tion to deal with pollution in ice-covered areas? In  resolving 
these doubts, much  will  depend  upon  the  reaction of potential 
user states over the  next few years if and  when  regular  commer- 
cial  navigation  becomes feasible. Will  Japan, the United States 
and European maritime powers accept Canadian claims and 
negotiate  mutually  beneficial  transit arrangements,  or will  they 
contest those claims ultimately in the International Court of 
Justice? 
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